AgDvLs-E-AIAEE
Making Development in Agriculture Happen:
What Lessons Have We Learned?
What Lessons Have We Not Learned?
James E. Christiansen, Professor and Coordinator of International Activities
Department of Agricultural Education, Texas A&M University
Abstract
Underlying all successful development programs is the thread of seeking out, paying attention to, involving, working with, collaborating with, and obtaining feedback from the intended beneficiaries of development programs, projects, and activities.
Five conditions exist that must be recognized and considered as they affect the development process. They are: 1) Social, cultural, technological, economic, and environmental issues must be linked in defining problems and solutions. 2) Despite an ever-increasing mutuality among human cultures, the reality is that “way down deep” we behave differently considering the cultural context in which we move. 3) A universal program strategy for development does not exist. We cannot follow a single model for development. Instead, we have to engage in strategic planning. 4) Differing perceptions exist ways of making development happen. 5) Introducing changes may fail and steps to minimize the consequences must be taken. Seventeen questions to minimize such consequences are presented.
At least 11 basic, proven principles of program and project management exist that result in successful development.
Twenty-four factors have been identified that take place when managing successful projects or programs that are not present or are handled inadequately when managing unsuccessful projects.
Having enough money to operate a program or project does not guarantee success if non-monetary principles of development are ignored.
Applying principles of development that pay attention to the human dimension is the key. Successful development in different places, times, and under different conditions where these factors have been present show that we can make development in agriculture happen.
(Paper begins on following page.)
Twenty-five years ago, the husband and wife team of William and Elizabeth Paddock wrote a very interesting, thought-provoking, but scathing book about development called We Don’t Know How: An Independent Audit of What They call Success in Foreign Assistance. Some people say that we still don’t know how to “do” agricultural development when we look at unsuccessful programs still underway today! However, I disagree. We have learned some principles, that if applied, will make development happen in agriculture. Let us explore some of those principles and related factors as applied in successful programs. However, before doing so, we need to set the stage by examining five conditions that affect the development process.
First, we must remember to link social, cultural, technological, economic, and environmental issues in defining problems and solutions. One lesson that has been learned the hard way in different countries is that development efforts of any type are not successful or sustainable unless they are tailored to the cultural values and past experiences of the society in which they are being undertaken. Many horror stories exist about development efforts that have been attempted, and have failed, because the culture of the beneficiaries was not taken into account. Coupled with this problem has been the common mistake of not anticipating and trying to prevent, or at least minimizing, undesirable social consequences that might arise from development efforts or the introduction of technological innovations. What happens is that people forget, or do not realize, that an interaction exists among technological, social, and cultural changes that affects the whole process of change and development.
Second, “Today, even when examining the compatibility of technology and culture, we must proceed on the assumption that there is an ever-increasing mutuality among the broad array of human cultures.” (Von Barloewen, 1992). In the age of jet travel and the shrinking global village, this mutuality tends to lull us into believing that we are pretty much the same around the world. On the surface, we seem to be, but that is superficial; underneath, we may be quite different considering the cultural context in which we move and have our being.
Third, we are learning that we cannot be all things to all people. We are learning that a universal program strategy for development does not exist. Instead, we have to engage in strategic planning. What is that? Strategic planning is the process that listens to and incorporates the voices of customers (clients and beneficiaries) into identifying and addressing a few critical issues, and in developing an infrastructure to resolve those issues (Texas Agricultural Extension Service, October 1995).
In the case of agricultural development, strategic planning involves using participatory rural appraisal (PRA) or rapid rural appraisal (RRA) to (1) help communities integrate relevant sectors by focusing on natural resources, (2) mobilize their human and natural resources to define problems, (3) consider previous successes, (4) evaluate local institutional capacities, (5) prioritize opportunities, and (6) prepare a systematic and site-specific plan of action. In many cases, strategic planning must include developing a system for systematic and coordinated parti-cipation among donors, governments, non-governmental organizations, and beneficiaries.
Fourth, we must remember that differing perceptions exist among sponsors, contractors, project managers, auditors, intended beneficiaries, and other participants about (1) the nature of the problem being solved or the project being undertaken, (2) ways of solving the problem, (3) roles played by different participants, (4) time needed, (5) worth or value of the innovation or project being undertaken, and (6) social consequences related to the problem or the project. To illustrate further: You think that this is the problem. They think that that is the problem. You think that this is the way to solve the problem. They think that that is the way to solve the problem. Etc.
Fifth, we have learned, that introducing changes and innovations may fail, and that there are consequences from bringing about change. In education, Latham reported eight reasons why educational innovations fail. They are: 1) People are disenchanted and disillusioned because the innovations are more difficult than expected, cause too much change, and take too much time. 2) Supporters of the innovation depart the scene, for whatever reason. 3) Personnel lack training, enthusiasm. 4) Funds run out. 5) There is no accountability. 6) Supervision is inadequate. 7) A “take-it-or-leave-it” attitude exists. 8) There are no consequences for not adopting. There is nothing new and earthshaking about these reasons, with the exception of #7. The subjective, and often unconsidered, factor of the state of mind of people promoting “development” toward the clientele supposedly being served truly can make or break a project.
However, we can ask questions to minimize the unanticipated and unintended consequences resulting from our development efforts, or to get people to consider those consequences before deciding to go ahead with development activities. The questions below are a good place to start. Spicer (1952, pp. 91-92) posed 13 of these questions over 48 years ago, but they hold true today.
What if anything, will the change replace?
What other tools and techniques are likely to be modified or will have to be modified as a result of the introduction? (Does installing pivot-point sprinklers mean moving fences?)
For what new tools and techniques is there likely to be a demand as a result of the introduction? (Does the use of computer-operated machinery mean that people have to attend specialized short courses to learn how to use it properly?)
Who within the society will benefit immediately from the introduction? Will the benefits be in terms of increased income, higher quality, less wastage, increased prestige, savings in time, or what? (Will the money lender be getting richer still?)
Who, if anyone, is likely to suffer immediately? In terms of real or fancied threat to economic security? In terms of social status? In terms of changes in routines? (Will wide scale use of mechanical carrot harvesters put women in packing sheds out of work?)
Who will benefit the most from the new technology? Who will have to abandon or change their occupation, job, or assignment if there is replacement? Who will be likely to modify their occupations? Who will have new occupations? Who will suffer over the “long haul”?
Will shifts in occupation affect the division of labor between men and women? Between the young and the old? Between the educated and the poorly educated?
How are the formal and informal social organizations in which people participate likely to be affected? Will their power or social position be enhanced or lowered? What shifts in relationships will occur? (Will the older farmer with many years of experience have to listen to a younger technician with less experience?)
Will the introduction of the new change open up new forms of cooperation? Or conflict? Or organizations? Or ways of doing business?
Do the individuals and group leaders affected understand the nature of the introduction? Have they had time to weigh the nature and extend of the change? (How do you feel when you are pushed to do something new and you haven’t had time to think it through?)
Who has participated in the planning of the change? Who has not participated? Why have they participated or not participated? Do the people who have participated have a vested interest in the change? (If a single variety district for cotton is to be established, have farmers who are not members of the Cotton Growers’ Association been involved?)
What customs, other than those arising from the technological change itself, are likely to be affected? Food habits? Relations of young and old? Marriage customs? Ceremonies? Religious beliefs? Major values? Consumer habits? Family patterns? Work patterns: Social or group relationships?
Does the change reinforce these customs, etc. suggested above, or conflict with them?
What attitudes exist toward the change agent as a person? Toward the social or ethnic group of which he/she is a member? Toward the institution or organizations that he/she represents? (Who do you trust more, the local county Extension agent or the seed dealer?)
What is the recent history of the relationship between the change agent (or change agents) and the people with whom he or she is working? (In the past, did you turn to the change agent involved in the new technology now being considered? If so, were you satisfied?)
What attitudes exist toward the innovation in the social system? (Do other farmers believe that the change being considered is worthy of consideration, or do they think that it is a harebrained scheme being introduced by outsiders?)
What is the history of the introduction of similar changes to this group? (Are these the same farmers who adopted precision-planting equipment or pump-back irrigation systems and now are considering drip irrigation technology?)
Keeping these five conditions above in the backs of our minds, let us now turn to some basic principles for development that exist, especially for grassroots development. They include the following: (Some have been adapted from Bunch, 1987, pp. 1 and 4.)
Start where the people are.
Identify the limiting factors, especially those based in local culture and customs.
Select technology that is appropriate to the local area. Technologies should be simple to learn, inexpensive, use resources available locally, and provide rapid successes.
Apply limited amounts of new technologies. Then the beneficiaries can learn and teach it to others as soon as possible so that a large number of people can be reached.
Test new ideas on a small scale.
Demonstrate technology to be considered through a system of small-scale experimentation. Beneficiaries should not have to risk too much to learn.
Start small programs and start them slowly.
Include a multiplier effect, such as training programs for trainers, as an important component so that successful beneficiaries become the trainers and supporters in the program, eventually taking it over completely.
Evaluate results. Strongly consider using the Context, Input, Process, Product (CIPP) model of program planning and evaluation developed originally by Stufflebeam (1973).
Develop a process of responding gradually to other felt needs of the people in a region or community according to their priorities. Examples might be water, health, education, family planning, participation in the political system, environmental improvement, etc.
Avoid all forms of paternalism, including the use of rebates or subsidies.
Concerning Principles 3 and 4, we know from extensive cognitive research that (1) the more contextual knowledge a person has about a subject, the more effectively the person learns and (2) those who are most skilled at using contextual knowledge learn and solve problems most effectively (Lefrancois, 1991). Consequently, learning and making decisions about problems, such as adoption, must be connected to experiences gained. These experiences should not come so fast and furiously that a person is overwhelmed mentally.
Concerning Principle 9, We should not undertake formal evaluations of the results of development projects without the active participation of beneficiaries. Generally, we have not involved those beneficiaries (Selener, Purdy, and Zapata, 1996.)
What lessons that we have learned (or not learned) in our development efforts? In examining successful and unsuccessful projects undertaken to further some aspect of agricultural development, certain common factors appear to be present in managing successful projects that were not present or were not handled adequately in managing unsuccessful projects. They are:
The project manager, the administrators, and/or decision makers in the different internal and external governmental or private agencies involved, and the project personnel had a clear understanding of what the project was to accomplish, i.e., the objective(s) of the project.
The project manager kept that objective(s) and understanding of the project in the forefront of people’s minds during the term of the project.
The project manager and other project personnel coped with conflicts by being innovative and adaptive. They took time to get facts and to understand the reasons for the stands that people took before taking action.
Authority and responsibility was given to people to make decisions at the level at which the effect of the decision would be felt., e.g., letting local organizations in China make decisions about the barefoot doctor program rather than a centralized office in the capitol.
Organizational autonomy was not only permitted, but defended, so that projects were not caught in the crossfire of being pawns in jurisdictional disputes.
Simple, systematic systems of gathering and reporting information and in providing feed-back were established. Information was widely shared and discussed.
The project manager developed his or her own information and communications networks as well as using existing organizational or institutional networking structures.
Multifaceted programs were implemented in stages or sequential phases with evaluation of the effectiveness of progress to date being carried out before the next phase was begun.
Flexible procedures were followed in selecting and training personnel involved in the pro-ject, but defensible criteria for doing so were used.
Pilot projects were linked with national programs, thus preparing and training personnel as well as providing insights into possible problems or adjustments that needed to be considered before large scale dissemination took place.
The project manager became attuned to various social and institutional nuances of the setting in which the project was operated and worked to convey this understanding to project personnel.
The project manager got people affected by the project to be involved in planning and imple-menting the project. This was especially true in the design and conduct of projects in which large numbers of people were to be involved, e.g., getting villagers to contribute labor, money, or something in kind when undertaking a village level public health project in Lebanon.
The project manager had a good feel for the timeliness and the appropriateness of activities to be carried out in the project. For example, a project review was postponed in Iran, even though scheduled, as it would have fallen during a traditional period of religious homage.
The project manager was consistently persistent in following through with the project’s plan and in providing continuity between and among the different activities in the project.
The project manager was willing to be flexible in order to meet those conditions that were not foreseen originally. As an example, in a project to introduce mass treatments for hookworms in Sri Lanka, it was found that doctors could gain acceptance by treating diseases other than hookworms, a practice that the manager permitted even though project officials had been warned against doing so by people in the home office.
The project manager used many techniques to get clients to accept new ideas, but above all, used demonstrations wherever possible. Even if this meant using field trials or setting up pilot projects, demonstrations were effective in reducing resistance.
The more contacts that project personnel had with beneficiaries or recipients, the more help-ful it was to the project. A correlation exists between the impact of the project and the amount of contact that project personnel have with beneficiaries.
Projects were more successful if project personnel were considered credible in the eyes of the beneficiaries, especially if project personnel were culturally sensitive as well as being technically expert in cross-cultural situations.
Successful projects were not so large and complex that their objectives and activities were difficult to visualize and describe, especially to bystanders and beneficiaries. Also, successful projects worked within the existing cultural system.
Financial aid was used to remove or to reduce risk, to provide demonstrations, or to provide training; funds were not used as “carrots on a stick” or subsidies. Money was not used as thinly disguised bribes to ensure compliance with the provisions of the contract covering the project. The beneficiaries or other organizations involved were committed by having to use some of their own resources, i.e., money, personnel, facilities, resources, etc., before project funds were committed.
Projects were more successful if any expatriate project personnel worked very closely with host country counterparts so that team efforts emerged. By the same token, by minimizing an interventionist donor style of project management, organizations such as the Inter-American Foundation (IAF) find that good relations are promoted and chances increase of an organization or agency being able to assume responsibility for a project.
Successful projects were not developed around rigid project designs that frustrated local initiative, ignored changing circumstances, and were managed from afar. Instead, they were designed to encourage flexibility, local control during implementation, local participation, and local “institution building.”
Project developers and project managers checked the institutional memories of their own organization and other organizations to determine if previous activities had occurred that had a bearing on the current project. People involved in successful projects have learned that there has to be a connection with the past. Unfortunately, most development agencies have no memory of what went on before. They repeat past mistakes or failed activities, or fail to capitalize on previous efforts that did have the potential to make a difference. An example is a maize breeding and dissemination project in Guatemala in which the people involved did not even know about the maize seed stock assembled and tested in a maize breeding program begun ten years before and put in storage at the Tropical Research Center at Bárcenas. The sad fact was that all the records were available and a faithful Guatemalan was caring for the seed collection.
Personnel responsible for successful projects involving the development, adoption, and dissemination of appropriate technology realize that scientists/technicians have to make adjustments if they are called upon to become change agents. Not all scientists can make those adjustments. Those who are happiest when they are so far back in a laboratory away from people that daylight has to be piped in to them should not be sought as change agents, even if they are the world’s greatest authority on a subject.
Do you remember the scientist from Israel that I mentioned earlier? In visiting with him about the way those projects in Tanzania were handled, it became quickly evident that several of the factors, principles, and activities listed above were violated. Although well funded, the net result was that there was no “buy in” by the Tanzanians. It was “that Israeli project” and not “our” Tanzanian project. The most critical factor apparently was one of treating the process of development as a mechanical process instead of a “people” process. The people who could have benefited the most were not involved, and in some cases, were not even aware of the projects.
On the other hand, a good example of a client-oriented development effort involving agricultural research is the farmer-based participatory research program that the Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT) has demonstrated in several locations throughout South America. Other examples involving extension, agricultural production, agricultural credit, and educational programs at the community level are those that the Fundación para el Desarrollo Agropecuario (FUNDAGRO) in Ecuador has successfully developed.
Have you noticed the most common thread weaving through the points that have been made so far? It is that involving, paying attention to, working with, and collaborating with the intended beneficiaries of development activities and projects is a basic factor in successful development. Unfortunately, in the past, and even today, many people engaged in development projects assume that they do not have to work with, and possibly more importantly, listen to and give responsibility to the people who are to benefit from development activities. It is unfortunate that we still see evidence of the “little tin god syndrome,” namely, “I know what is good for you.”
On the other hand, we have evidence that listening to, collaborating with, involving, and giving responsibility to people who are to benefit from our development efforts does result in their acceptance of the development activity, their adoption of appropriate practices and innovations, sustainability, and most importantly, our working ourselves out of a job in the context that we are no longer needed to promote change.
In summary, if you take one point home with you today, I hope that it is reassurance that we can make development in agriculture happen, if we remember that participation by people affected by the development process in the development process is necessary.
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